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1 Introduction
The first national demographic surveys in
Palestine (PCBS 2002, 2006a, 2006b) revealed an
unusually high proportion of unmarried women
in the West Bank and Gaza, while men were
almost universally shown to be married. I wanted
to find out why there were so many single
women. As I began my research, my attention
quickly shifted from the statistics to the
narratives behind the numbers. These women’s
stories engaged me; from a life in service to the
nation, told by older single women, to the tales of
moral danger circulating around young
unmarried women today. However, they also
taught me to be cautious in applying the label
‘unmarried’. The young women I first spoke with
were not keen to be identified in this way,
implying a permanent state of singlehood. The
response of Wisam,1 an unmarried woman in her
forties, living and working in Ramallah, to my
request for an interview served as a warning to
avoid any temptation to treat unmarried women
in Palestine or elsewhere as a unitary category: 
The project you are working on sounds very interesting.
The problem is that I don’t think I have much to
contribute to this study. I don’t see myself in those
terms. I don’t think the fact that I am unmarried has
any significant advantages or disadvantages over what
I choose to do privately or publicly.
Her words undermined the assumption that
singlehood is at the centre of an unmarried
woman’s identity or perception of herself. It also
implied that our interviews should be embedded
in a broader life story approach in order to
understand the significance or non-significance
of being unmarried in the course of life events.
This article reflects on the voices of two
generations of unmarried women (aged 19–29
and 45–68) from focus groups and topical life
interviews which we conducted in the West Bank
and Gaza between 2007 and 2008,2 to explore the
diversity and commonalities in their lives in the
context of a society experiencing prolonged
warlike conditions, political crisis and social
disruption. Using the lens of the ‘body’, I
examine how these women negotiate their daily
lives and the dynamics of choice for their futures.
2 Demographic profiles
Whilst in most of the Arab world the rising
number of single women is connected with
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delayed marriage, what is striking in Palestine,
and requires explanation, is that Palestinian
women in the West Bank and Gaza appear to
have a ‘unique marriage pattern: early but not
universal’ (Rashad et al. 2005: 3). Palestinian
women marry (and bear children) at the median
age of 18, but there are significant numbers of
women remaining single. Although official
national statistics are only available from 1995,
other surveys and research suggest that female
singlehood has a longer historical trajectory. 
As we can see from Table 1, rates of singlehood
are consistently higher in the West Bank than
Gaza. In Palestine in general almost one in ten
women over 40 are never married compared to
1.5 per cent in Egypt and about 4 per cent in
Jordan. In the Arab region, only Lebanon, Tunis
and Algeria have a higher proportion of never-
married women, and the first two have a
considerably higher average marriage age for
women (see Drieskens 2006 for Lebanon).
In reviewing data from the 2000 and 2004
Demographic and Health surveys in Palestine
(PCBS 2000; PCBS 2004), it is clear that never-
married women are clustered at opposing poles
of education. For 2004, almost half of never-
married women over 30 had only primary
education or lower, while 22.9 per cent had above
secondary education. Only 10.7 per cent of
married women aged 30 and over had above
secondary education. However, the gap widens
with age, suggesting ‘that educated women had
more difficulty marrying in the past’ (Halabi
2007: 39). Our focus groups confirmed the
perception that, in combination with other
factors like employment, post-secondary
education has become an asset. Coupled with
perceived earlier ages of marriage in certain
settings (primarily rural), girls with only
secondary education find themselves trapped,
with diminishing marriage prospects on the one
hand and lack of income opportunity on the
other.
3 The ‘crisis’ of unmarried women: regional and
Palestinian discourses
Wisam’s words in the introduction neatly counter
contemporary discourses which frame unmarried
women as a ‘crisis’ in society. Media discourse
across the Arab world – in the last decade in
particular – present the growing number of single
women as a problem (Ghazi 2006). Some reports
seem to imply an epidemic that needs public
intervention for the health of the society, for
example the Khaleej Times read: ‘Alarm bells ring
as rate of UAE spinsters rises’ and called for the
‘involvement of all segments of the society as well
as the authorities’ to combat this ‘alarming rate’,
given as an entirely improbable 73 per cent
(Ibrahim 2004). It is fair, I think to consider the
construction of this ‘crisis’ as a form of moral
panic (Cohen 2002) whereby unmarried women
are ‘chastised by their societies’ (Ghazi 2006) and
come to represent social ills and cultural disorder.
Media and public discourse also point to an
unsettling of long-held cultural assumptions
about the universality of marriage and raise
questions about whether the ‘cognitive frame of
marriage’ (Friedl 2003) has started to shift. 
Although Palestine was late in joining the
discourse around the single woman ‘crisis’, the
issue has emerged strongly in recent years,
triggered by the ‘missing men’ killed and injured
in the second intifada. Islamist political
movements (particularly Hamas) and Islamic
charities and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) have embraced the mission of collective
marriage ceremonies explicitly framed as
reducing the social ill of unmarried women and
Table 1 Gaza and West Bank: proportion of never-married women 
2000 2004
Age Range West Bank Gaza West Bank Gaza
30–34 14.8 8.5 16.1 9.3
35–39 16.1 8.5 13.2 8.7
40–44 12.3 6.4 11.7 3.5
Source Halabi (2007: Table 4). Figures are based on calculations from the raw data.
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allowing young men to marry cheaply (in an era
of prohibitive wedding expenses). The number of
male deaths from the second intifada is offered as
an explanation both for the crisis and a
justification for public action. The Hamas-led
government and/or Islamic charities in Gaza
staged ten collective ceremonies in 2008 for
unmarried women and for war widows to
remarry. ‘There will be more weddings’, said one
organiser, ‘no one will remain single’ (El-
Khoudary 2008). The ‘epidemic’ of unmarried
women is thus partially socially constructed,
reminding us that a moral panic does not imply
that ‘something does not exist’ (Cohen 2002: vii)
but does denote a form of cultural politics that
crystallises public anxieties. 
4 Bodies, borders and bio-politics
Two of the focus groups conducted in the
Southern West Bank, one in Sair, a village in the
Hebron area and the other in the Dheisheh
refugee camp near Bethlehem, provide an
example of how these public anxieties are
demonstrated in women’s everyday lives. Both
communities are relatively disadvantaged and
subject to Israeli military violence and profound
insecurity. However, when asked about their
hopes for the next five years, the young women in
Sair said: ‘There is nothing encouraging ahead of
us’, ‘Everything is forbidden to us, we can’t go to
work or leave the house’, and more disturbingly,
‘Our life is over’. In stark contrast the women in
Dheisheh planned to continue their education,
get a job and marriage: ‘A bachelor’s degree is
not enough, I need a master’s’ and ‘I want to
develop my personality and dreams’.
Why the striking difference in visions for the
future? Why so much hope in Dheisheh and so
much despair in Sair? In fact the groups showed
that the aspirations of Sair and Dheisheh were
more similar than appears. The women in Sair
also expressed a desire for education and work
outside the home, but the main difference was
they felt these were impossible goals. The two
groups of women were distinguished by four
different social conditions. The first was access to
education. Most of the young women in Sair had
completed high school, but this level of education
proved insufficient for work and marriage. In
contrast, at least half the group in Dheisheh
were either engaged in post-secondary education
or aspired to it. Secondly, the supportive environment
of civil society organisations in Dheisheh played a
decisive role in encouraging the girls’ dreams
and offering opportunities for public involvement
– as did the support of their families for their
education (Rosenfeld 2004). 
Thirdly, although both communities endure
restrictions on movement, they are located
within different regulative and protective environments.
Young women from Dheisheh can go to
Bethlehem – with its higher education institutes
and wider opportunities for work – without
crossing a checkpoint. In contrast, young women
in Sair have to cross Israeli checkpoints to reach
Hebron, and Palestinian police protection is only
infrequently available.3 Significantly, Dheisheh’s
own internal security (both physically and
socially) is also much stronger due to the camp’s
very active local committee. This impacts on the
final difference: perceived and actual threats to female
personal security, defined explicitly in terms of the
body. In Sair, families placed severe restrictions
on their unmarried daughters’ mobility, due to
the intertwined fears of physical and moral
danger, whether from Israeli soldiers on the
village outskirts or unruly young men on its
streets. It also related to the so-called ‘honour’
killing of a young married woman in murky
circumstances where a made-up pornographic
image of her was circulated via mobile phones.
Although murders of women under the rubric of
‘honour crimes’ are relatively few at 10–20 per
year,4 the effects of this incident were drastic.
The victim was declared innocent by the imam of
the local mosque, but young women were still
barred from using the telephone and often from
leaving their homes. The fear – and moral panic –
of the community was, in a literal way, ‘embodied’
in the restrictions placed on these young women’s
bodies and selves. Their narratives – and those
circulated around them – are ‘narratives of
sexuality’ in their focus on bodily vulnerability
and threats to bodily and moral integrity. The
perceived and actual physical and sexual threats
to the bodies of young unmarried women point to
their liminal status not only as markers of a
normative female sexuality (Sa’ar 2004), but as
representing threats and violations to the
Palestinian body politic. 
At the same time, young women can be agents of
change, challenging borders and expanding
boundaries. This emerges in the ambitions of the
young women in Dheisheh, but is also evident
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even in the much more restricted circumstances
of Sair. A female secondary school student
explains that restrictions cause both despair and
resolve among girls:
The suppression of girls’ opinions and our culture of
shame means families do not like their girls to study
and rent places outside the village. This comes from
hearing so much about the problems of girls,
particularly honour crimes. This causes girls to be
depressed but also causes them to cling to education.
This dynamic of restriction and resolve is a
dynamic of bodies and boundaries that, as Butler
notes, is central to the relationship of bodies and
the world around them: 
Not only did bodies tend to indicate a world
beyond themselves, but this movement beyond
their own boundaries, a movement of
boundary itself, appeared to be quite central
to what bodies ‘are’. (Butler 1993: ix)
In the context of Palestine, bodies and
boundaries are critical constituents of an Israeli
politics of spatial segregation where an
elaborate, shifting and growing matrix of control
is formed by some 500 checkpoints or barriers
that divide Palestinian towns and villages from
each other. This checkpoint system has ‘grown to
govern the entire spectrum of Palestinian life
under occupation’ (Weizman 2007: 147). While
Israeli settler bodies move freely, Palestinian
bodies are contained and humiliated. 
The translation of public insecurity, invasive
violence and political corruption into moral
danger is evident in Palestinian daily discourse,
particularly in the circulation of rumours and
sexualised narratives (Johnson 2007b). The
discourses that surround unmarried women thus
offer a lens to this complex present, as well as
contrasts and continuities with the past where
unmarried women’s bodies in specific social and
economic circumstances were conceived as in
service to a national and social project. Older
women (aged 45–65), interviewed at the beginning
of this project, often expressed this sentiment,
articulated by 52-year-old Mariam from Breij
camp in Gaza: ‘I wanted to be someone, to serve
society’. This service was frequently seen as
replacing marriage and advancing the national
struggle against occupation. Coming back from
her university studies in Cairo in 1971, Zahira
Kamal, who later became the first Minister of
Women’s Affairs in the Palestinian Authority
noted: ‘I was not thinking of marriage. It was the
start of occupation and that was on my mind’. In
contemporary Palestine, the notion of the body
(and mind) in service to the nation has been
radically reconfigured.
5 Is education empowerment? The significance
of location and mobility
As we have seen above, education is a significant
aspiration for many young unmarried Palestinian
women. In the older generation, education,
particularly post-secondary, was a key to individual
autonomy, public service and social status – but
sometimes a detriment to marriage. Educated
women were valued as markers of a desired
modernity. For Palestinian parents in the same
post-1948 era, education was often seen as a form
of portable capital in the insecure conditions of
statelessness after the loss of Palestine. From the
provision of free education by the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to the
founding of Palestinian universities in the West
Bank and Gaza in the 1970s, education has been a
venue for both mobility and security in the highly
insecure circumstances of Palestinian life, and
female educational levels have increased
consistently. Indeed at present, young Palestinian
women now have slightly higher enrolment rates
in post-secondary education than their male
counterparts. 
In the older generation, the role of fathers in
supporting their daughters’ education is
prominent. The father of Ilham (who later
achieved a PhD in Linguistics and became a
Birzeit University professor) told her: ‘Ya binti,
[O my daughter] there is no man in the world
that is worth a university degree’. In focus groups
with the young women, education remains a
central goal, but its utility as an avenue to
autonomy and/or public service varies. Unlike
the earlier generation, post-secondary education
is perceived to be a marriage asset if coupled
with secure employment. Young women with less
education, particularly those in villages who
finish high school and remain at home, find
themselves with diminishing marriage prospects.
A young woman in her mid-twenties from Beit
Fajjar, near Bethlehem, herself ‘only’ a high
school graduate, observed ruefully, ‘Only a
“Doctora” [a PhD holder] can get married at a
later age than 18 or 20’.
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Where education is the sole improvement, the
life of a young woman in rural or marginalised
settings may not change too much. Samia, an
Open University graduate from Tubas village in
the Jordan Valley, expressed constraints on her
movement imposed by community gossip and
pressure: 
I like to go to work. But people say, she is not an
employee, why does she go? People interfere with
everything. If I am walking in the street, they say ‘this
is not your day to go to work, what are you doing?’
Samia, like many of the young women in our
groups who pursued higher education, was a
student at the Jerusalem (Al Quds) Open
University. For young women, the Open
University offers an education which can be
pursued within the safer confines of home (and
village), with only occasional forays into student
life. This also means that the potentially
liberating atmosphere of the campus is largely
absent. Selwa from Beit Fajjar said that she has
been going to the Jerusalem Open University for
three years but declared proudly ‘I have never
spoken to a young man’.
Amira, who is on the student council at the
Hebron site of the Jerusalem Open University
and from a powerful family in the area, has a
confidence in her future that led her to turn
down a cousin in marriage and to insist on a
university education. She expresses her
trajectory of education and employment in
spatial terms, saying she has ‘no borders’:
In my family, I am the only one who entered the
university. I am always active, even though people say
‘Why go to the university and get tired?’ For me there
are no borders. My cousin asked for me but I didn’t
want. I want to go from the student council to a
wazifeh [a secure job as an employee].
While she is buoyed by her class and family
position (and her strong personality), her
consciousness of a need to change and move is
shared by other young women who may not have
her personal and family assets.
6 Marriage age, staying single and ‘change’
An interesting consensus emerged in all the focus
groups that the best age for a young woman to
marry was in her early to mid-twenties when she
has her own personality; significantly later than
the median age of 18. However, particularly in
village settings, most agreed that girls usually
marry younger than this and that their marriage
chances after that age were small. The young
women in Sair concurred that prospective
husbands ‘really like a girl who is 15 or 16… 20
maximum’. This gap between the ideals of young
women (and often their mothers as well) and the
reality of early marriage is a source of great
tension, as well as potential for change. Hadeel, a
young unmarried woman in her twenties from
Shawawreh, a village on the arid Eastern slopes
of Bethlehem, is unsuccessfully looking for work.
She says: ‘Women are more conscious now. They
don’t just marry anyone. There is a change’.
This feeling of change is also evident in the more
prosperous village of Beit Fajjar. Basma, an
unmarried women in her late thirties who looks
after her elderly parents5 says that her mother
inherited a house and land from her parents and
will give it to Basma. ‘Girls no longer accept
everything. They want their rights’.
Yet the combined force of consciousness of
rights, pride in education, and family trust does
not seem to help these young women with their
twin preoccupations of marriage and, almost
obsessively, search for income-generating work.
Opportunities are not only limited by the job
market6 but by what is considered respectable –
being a teacher is fine, but being a secretary is
described as ‘difficult’ due to the proximity of
male staff and the threat of sexual harassment.
Again, bodies are a source of danger and
vulnerability. One young woman from Sair said,
‘I took a course in computers for six months and
then was forbidden to work’.
In terms of marriage, when we asked why families
wanted a young bride of 15 or 16, the answer was
proverbial and echoed elsewhere in our
discussions: ‘They say the husband should raise
her with his own hand’. For a bride to be raised
like a child by her husband is of course the stark
opposite of the bride with her own ‘personality’
and education that consistently emerged as an
ideal. We asked the young women in Sair, none of
whom were able to continue to higher education,
if university students graduating at 21 or 22 may
have a chance at marriage:
Well, if you have a degree and can work, it’s OK. If
you have only tawjihi [general secondary school
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examination], there is not much hope. We have
‘nothing in our hands’.
The young women broadly blame their
constrictions on ‘the political situation’, and the
fear it generates among their families. Whether
tales of an Israeli soldier forcing a girl to kiss a
young man at the Hebron checkpoint, or the
story of false pornographic images on mobile
phones, the present is full of ‘embodied’ dangers
– and interestingly, the young women look to the
past, not the future, for better times. The young
women in Sair affirm, ‘It wasn’t always like this.
Things got worse in the Al Aqsa intifada. Families
are afraid for their girls and there is no security’.
7 Tropes of dis-ease and disorder: customary
marriage and old men and young brides
Many young women – and sometimes their
mothers as well – identified  ‘new’ and disturbing
forms of marriage, particularly the very old
marrying the very young, and customary
marriage (zawaj urfi – unregistered marriage
without a formal marriage contract) as the one
danger they face rather than physical peril. This
was particularly potent during our meeting in
Sair where as we walked up the steep hill, an
Israeli army jeep entered the village, boys threw
stones, and shots were fired. Such an encounter
was, to use a common Palestinian expression
with irony, ‘aadi’ (ordinary), something these
young women face daily (Johnson 2007b). In
conversation , this ‘ordinary’ situation of war was
ignored while stories of improper marriages as
moral disorder predominated.
We thought customary marriage was uncommon
in Palestine, yet the subject spontaneously
emerged in discussions around local press
articles on the rise of youth suicide. Interestingly,
students at Hebron University immediately
assumed the suicides were female although the
account described both male and female deaths.
Pressure from families and social and economic
reasons were cited. All agreed, however, that one
cause was the ‘… many customary marriages
where girls are placed in immoral and deceitful
conditions’. One recounted, ‘One girl was in an
urfi marriage and then she got engaged to
someone else. She committed suicide’.
Although the Islamic Sharia allows a form of
customary marriage where there is a marriage
contract signed by a guardian, zawaj urfi has
come to have many other forms, including a
secret agreement between the couple only, which
would constitute an illicit relation in Sharia
terms. The extent and forms of customary
marriage have not been explored in the
Palestinian context, but the discourse circulating
in our discussions points to it both as an
emerging phenomenon and a trope for other
forms of disorder. ‘We never had this before’, was
an often repeated refrain. 
Another key narrative of improper marriage that
emerged frequently was old men marrying the
very young. In Sair, the material motive for such
marriages was prominent: ‘Two old men married
sisters of 15 and 16. Their families did it just for
the money. The old men were rich’. The young
women conclude: ‘Of course there is force and
oppression [zulm] in making these matches’.
Given that marriages (and weddings, as noted by
Johnson et al. 2009) are a highly resonant symbol
for social and political harmony – so much so
that democratic Palestinian elections were
widely described as a ‘Palestinian wedding’ –
illicit or improper marriage is an equally
resonant symbol for a world out of kilter. 
8 Virtual dangers, actual bodies
Another striking version of physical insecurity
transformed into moral disorder came in
Shawawreh. Entering the meeting shortly after
the discussion began, Um Nabil was a tall and
imposing woman, draped in black, with a strong
square face. The black was not for her
widowhood but for her brother, who had been
assassinated along with three other militants by
the Israeli army in Bethlehem a few weeks
earlier. 
With this death on everyone’s mind as a
reminder of the insecurity of Palestinian daily
life, we were particularly surprised by the
unanimous answer when we asked: what were
the main dangers to girls in their late teens in
the village? The answer came quickly: ‘Television
– but only satellite television. It is a disaster’.
Everyone agreed with this, although they
hastened to say that they are not against satellite
television per se, that there are useful educational
programmes and they do not even oppose music
programmes (thus distancing themselves from
some Islamist positions). However, they assert
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there are immoral programmes that disturb
young people. Refugee women living in Doha, a
suburb just outside Dheisheh refugee camp, were
even more emphatic about the dangers of
satellite television. A middle-aged women with
teenage daughters, when asked why a young girl
might kill herself answered ‘salsalaat’ (soap opera
series that are very popular on satellite
television) that undermine morals. The notion
here is that these series put false ideas about life
and morality into the heads of the susceptible
young. The women in this particular focus group,
mostly mothers of unmarried daughters, seemed
to cast these lurid virtual soap opera dangers
onto their real streets. As one declared, she
trusts her 16-year-old daughter but won’t allow
her out of the house because, ‘I am frightened
for her. The shebab [young boys] might talk badly
to her. They might give her an acamol
[paracetamol] but it is really drugs’.
Other women then contribute stories of alcohol
put in a soft drink and given to a teenage girl,
and again fake pornographic pictures being
circulated by mobile phone. While young men –
particularly the unemployed and frustrated
young men of this period – are certainly
occasionally guilty of incidents of sexual
harassment, we seem once again to be in the
terrain of moral panic and globalised and
sexualised dangers conditioned by satellite as
well as by the actual and insecure conditions on
the streets of Doha and Bethlehem. The sense of
a generation gone astray is of course not
particular to Palestine but the contrast made –
with previous generations which stood for
national struggle and values – can be striking.
One 29-year-old activist in Amari, who had
participated as a boy in the popular mobilisation
of the first intifada (1988–93) contrasted himself
to the teenagers in Amari’s youth club: ‘We were
the generation of intifada, they are the
generation of satellite’.
The voices above are countered to some extent
by the opinions of young unmarried women
themselves about satellite television. Most are
eager to distance themselves from its sexualised
images. When asked if Nancy Ajram, a very
popular and sexy singer on various satellite
stations, was someone they admire, young
women unanimously rejected her – often with
shy laughter. They do note dangers, but often
different dangers than the older generation. One
young woman from Dheisheh mentioned the risk
of believing everything on television:
There was a young woman here in her twenties who
went on a diet – just a cup of tea a day – because she
saw all the images on satellite TV. Her haemoglobin
went to three and she died.
Young women in the Jenin focus group noted
young men are not respectful: ‘All they think of is
sex, not love’. Their behaviour was blamed on
the internet. However, young women found
solace in religious and educational programmes
on satellite television, naming several female
sheikhs or religious instructors who they greatly
admired – and who address issues of family life,
bodily comportment and life goals that young
women are eager to understand, and may not
find answers from their own families. 
In fact, many of the young women in our
discussions were uneasy with their knowledge
about their bodies and felt they needed more
information. A young woman from Sair said, ‘We
are embarrassed, we don’t know about our
bodies. When we ask someone says “it’s wrong to
talk like that” [Eib tehki hek]’.
Young women in Beit Fajjar, however, found
mothers more forthcoming, saying they learned
about periods from their mothers and that ‘It’s
not like the old days’. And most young women –
even those who said they couldn’t talk about sex
– said such talk was not shameful (mish eib) and
that girls needed more understanding. Tala from
Dheisheh said: ‘I am embarrassed but we need to
know about married life’. Manal agreed and
added, in an equally embarrassed tone: ‘Of
course we don’t want anything silly, it should be
scientific’.
The last remark reflects a feeling that that there
is a proper, and an improper way to treat sexual
matters which is also applied to notions of
freedom. Fadia from Jenin refugee camp, after
condemning men who tell their wives and
daughters that everything is forbidden, hastened
to add: ‘I am not saying that someone should be
just loose and do whatever she wants. There
should be a balance’.
The desire for young women to understand their
bodies is clearly articulated – as are the barriers
to such understanding. One young woman in
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Dheisheh addressed a telling barb to the many
NGO activities to ‘train’ Palestinian youth in
democracy: ‘Really, we are bored from always
having the same subject, communications
workshops, democracy. Learning about our
bodies would be better’.
9 Can an unmarried woman be happy?
While most of the young unmarried women in
our discussions continued to see marriage –
particularly with a sympathetic partner – as an
important good, there were voices of dissent
about the happiness of married life and the
inevitable misery of unmarried women. When
asked if an unmarried woman can have a happy
life a young woman from the Hebron area village
of Tarqumia, had a personal example:
Yes, my aunt stayed unmarried, she was political and
taught school. She was happy and went around. She
went to Russia when she liked.
Her aunt’s trajectory – as a professional, political
activist and an autonomous spirit – is typical of
most of the life stories of older professional
unmarried women recorded in this project, and
indeed of even older generations of unmarried
Palestinian women who founded schools,
charitable societies, and participated in the
nationalist movement (Fleischmann 2003). An
autonomous life was valued both for its own sake
and for the opportunity for public service. Zahira
reflected on her life course:
What you want when you are young, you don’t when
you are older. I value the freedom and space, I don’t
want to lose it. I am happy with my life. It was my
decision [not to marry] and I go with it. If my life was
repeated, I will do it again.
Whether young women in both more restricted
and contradictory times can find the same
fulfilment in a life without marriage, is an open
question which the young women in our focus
groups addressed in different ways. Most of the
young women in Jenin agreed that ‘If you are not
married, you feel weak’. Some limited their
aspirations, ‘I don’t think of love at all. At 27 or
28, it is not one hundred per cent that I will find
someone’. 
Yet they did not necessarily locate the source of
the misery in their lack of a spouse, but rather in
the community responses to their unmarried
state. Unmarried women could be happy, they
opined, in certain circumstances, ‘Yes if there
was no society to say awanes [old maids,
spinsters] she could be happy’.
The language is significant: awanes [plural of
a’nes] is a term with a strong negative
connotation. Perhaps less negative, but certainly
telling is the common practice of calling
unmarried women, whatever their age ‘banaat’
(girls), a term also meaning daughters. This
infantilisation and desexualisation of unmarried
women has the connotation of being excluded
from adult femininity (Sa’ar 2004).
Nonetheless, in Beit Fajjar, Basma evoked the
authority of the Qur’an, affirming that it says
you do not have to get married. And almost all
agreed that another key to happiness as an
unmarried woman was stable employment. In
Shawawreh, a mother defended her two
daughters:
An unmarried bint [girl, daughter] can go as she
wants. My daughter is 28 years old and she works and
buys her clothes and does as she wants. One works in
Beit Sahur. There is another one in Abu Dis – bint
sharifi [an honourable girl]. Girls today do not marry
min makaan [just anybody].
There is thus a long tradition of unmarried
women with fulfilled and significant lives that
needs to be recovered from the past
(Fleischmann 2003) into the present era where
unmarried women are increasingly a locus of
moral panic and a trope for social disorder.
There are also stirrings of change, contradictory
and frustrated, but embodied in the
determination and thwarted desires of a new
generation of young women for a productive and
meaningful life. 
Two short films made by young unmarried
women explore these contradictions, desires and
determination. Rahaf examines the effects of a
broken engagement on a young girl who is
ostracised and condemned. Fadia El Dein, the
filmmaker, herself from a village, says:
I passed through this experience and I don’t want
people to feel sorry for me. People see the girl who has
a broken engagement as someone who will be a
spinster for life. (Shashat 2008: 16)
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In Remote Control (a short film by Dara Khader),
Amal, a student at Al Najah University in
Nablus, is being teased by her friends about her
devotion to her boyfriend Ahmed when she hears
the news that she has received a full scholarship
to the USA. Ahmed demands she turn it down.
Later at home, Amal receives a call from Ahmed
who thinks she has refused the scholarship; she
tells him she has to think about it. She turns on
her laptop, writes an acceptance letter, and
presses ‘send’. In the last shot, Amal appears sad,
reflective – but determined to move.
Notes
1 Names and some other identifying details
have been changed to protect privacy except
in the case of the former Minister of Women’s
Affairs, Zahira Kamal and D. Ilham Abu
Ghazaleh, both of whom chose not to be
anonymous. Names of women in the focus
groups have also been changed.
2 There were ten focus groups conducted by the
author and Fadwa Abu Labban with
unmarried women aged 19–29 in the West
Bank, and nine topical life interviews with
unmarried women aged 45–68: seven in the
West Bank interviewed by the author and two
in Gaza. A special thanks to Andaleeb Udwan
for conducting and transcribing the two
important interviews in Gaza despite the
severe conditions there at the time. The nine
topical life stories are examined separately
and in more detail in Johnson (2007a).
3 Under the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement
signed between Israel and the PLO, the West
Bank was divided into three areas, of which the
largest was Area C (about 40 per cent) under
sole Israeli security control. Area A (the main
Palestinian towns) is under Palestinian security
control, while Area B is nominally under joint
control, but in fact control is exercised by
Israel. The provisions for Area A have been
violated repeatedly by Israeli invasions.
4 In 2006, there were 14 honour crimes
recorded in Palestine, rising to 18 in 2007
(PICCR 2007, 2008). Almost all were on
unmarried women and committed by male
members of their natal family. Johnson (2008)
explores cases of honour crimes in the larger
context of violence against Palestinian women
and girls.
5 While the care of an elderly parent or parents
is frequently the duty of the unmarried
daughter, Basma has embraced her task and
also conducts activities for the elderly: ‘I give
to people, I don’t think of myself at all’.
6 Palestine registers unusually low female
labour force participation (at about 12 per
cent) largely due to gendered and restricted
labour markets. It is also true that
participation (and approval of the same) rises
when conditions are more secure. At present,
insecurity and instability has shrunk both the
actual labour market – there are fewer jobs
for an ever-growing number of young job
seekers – and the perceived market of
acceptable jobs for women.
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